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1Sortition, Rotation and Mandate: Conditions for Political Equality and Deliberative Reasoning
David Owen and Graham Smith
The sortition chamber proposal laid out by John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright defends 
extending sortition into the legislative branch of government and specifies how such a body 
would work. We sympathize with the motivation for this enterprise: Sortition ought to be more 
widely institutionalized within contemporary democratic polities. Nevertheless, reflection on the 
practice of antecedents of the sortition chamber—in particular its historical use in Ancient 
Greece and more recent application in contemporary minipublics—raises questions about its 
feasibility and desirability. Our critical analysis considers primarily the democratic value of the 
proposal to replace one half of a bicameral elected system with a sortition chamber. We also 
offer general considerations for situating a sortition chamber within a democratic ecology more 
favorable to its operation. 
Our central concern is that selection to the legislature by sortition in the form proposed 
by Gastil and Wright will fail to realize sufficiently two fundamental democratic goods, namely 
political equality and deliberative reasoning. As the proposal is currently conceived, there is a 
failure to recognize that, in both historical and contemporary practice, sortition is combined with 
other institutional devices to achieve these goods. First, the use of sortition for selection of 
members has typically been paired with sortition in allocation of offices within the institution, 
along with regular rotation of membership and offices after short periods of service. Second, 
such institutions have had a limited mandate rather than broad agenda-setting powers. We 
contend that there are good reasons to believe that, without the application of regular rotation and 
a limited mandate, the sortition chamber is unlikely to be able to defend its members against 
2asymmetries in social and economic power to the extent necessary for such a body to be 
democratically effective and realize the goods of political equality and deliberative reasoning. If 
cogent, this objection undermines the feasibility and desirability of the proposed sortition 
chamber, both as a democratic institution and as a means of advancing the longer-term cause of 
participatory or deliberative democracy.  
We conclude with an alternative proposal, which envisions a responsive sortition 
legislature that makes more extensive use of internal sortition and rotation and recognizes the 
importance of establishing limited mandates. We also argue for a steep increase in the number of 
members. As a first step toward infusing sortition into the legislative branch, we argue that our 
alternative is both more realistic (from a democratic standpoint) and more utopian (from a 
strategic standpoint). 
<A>Sortition and institutional design—historical and contemporary lessons
Prior to the rise of mass political parties in the late 19th and early 20th century, sortition was 
recognized as a more democratic mechanism of selection of representatives than election. It was 
seen as being less susceptible to the influence of economic and social power than electoral 
processes and as enacting a stronger commitment to political equality. In this section, we offer a 
brief reconstruction of the circumstances of sortition in two contexts—Athenian democracy1 and 
1
 There are other significant historical periods of the use of sortition – in particular, the 
Renaissance republicanism of Italian cities such as Venice and Florence in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries and under the Crown of Aragon. In these periods, sortition was utilised 
primarily to select major and minor offices rather than assemblies, but this has some resonance 
with Athenian practice because sortition was introduced as a defence against faction and unstable 
3the contemporary practice of deliberative minipublics—to explain the democratic reputation of 
sortition and the conditions of its effective use.
<B> Athenian democracy
For Aristotle, democracy as a specific type of regime is defined by citizens ruling and being 
ruled in turn. Establishing this principle involved citizens being eligible for all non-specialist 
offices and selected by lot to fill them, where offices had short terms. These mechanisms and 
offices enabled and constrained the sovereign assembly as the open participatory space within 
which each citizen could speak. As exemplified in Athens, following Cleisthenes’ reforms in 507 
BCE, the Ekklesia (Assembly) was surrounded by an ecology of institutions that used random 
selection: the Boule (the Council of Five Hundred), magistracies, the Dikasteria (People’s 
Courts) and, following the reinstatement of democracy after the Peloponnesian war in the fourth 
century BCE, the Nomothetai (Legislative Boards). The Council had a variety of functions that 
cut across our modern understanding of legislative, executive and judicial functions, most 
notably preparing the work of the Assembly, implementing many of its decisions, and overseeing 
public administration. The People’s Court played a critical political function by overseeing all 
coalitions. See Morgens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), Oliver Dowlen The Political Potential of Sortition (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2008) and Yves Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy? Random 
Selection in Politics from Athens to the Present (manuscript, 2017), originally published as Petite 
histoire de l'expérimentation démocratique. Tirage au sort et politique d'Athènes à nos jours, (La 
Découverte, Serie ‘Poches’, Paris, 2011). Our reconstruction of the institutions of Athenian 
democracy that follows draws on these texts.
4the other organs of the political system. The Legislative Boards reviewed proposals from the 
Assembly; only where there was a majority would a proposal become law or an existing law be 
repealed.
The introduction of selection by sortition is best understood as a response to the 
experience—and continuing threats—of tyranny, oligarchy, and civic strife posed by aristocratic 
pursuit of power. But it would be a mistake to focus on sortition alone because its introduction 
was complemented by other institutional reforms. 
First, Cleisthenes took the rural villages and city neighborhoods (both called demes) as 
the basic units of political organization. These were then re-arranged into ten tribes or phylai. 
This re-articulation of the tribes—and their use with respect to selection for the Council (fifty 
from each tribe), People’s Courts and Legislative Boards, and for election to the office of 
strategoi (one from each tribe)—was designed to break up both existing aristocratic alliances and 
established patron/client relationships based on aristocratic kinship networks. 
Second, rapid rotation of membership and rotation of offices within sortition bodies 
reduced the risks of concentrations of power. An annual lot chose the five hundred members of 
the Council, with fifty citizens aged thirty or over from each of the ten phylai, where the number 
from each deme within each phylai was proportional to its population. 
The use of sortition extended further into the operation of the Council, with fifty bouletai 
selected at a time to take on its main tasks for one tenth of the year, with one randomly selected 
each day to act as chairman. No one could serve more than twice on the Council, which ensured 
widespread citizen participation in this key institution. Roughly one third of all citizens are 
estimated to have served as a Council member. 
5There was also widespread participation in the Courts. For this purpose, six thousand 
citizens were selected by lot annually. Though there were occasional plenary sessions, most of 
the work of the popular courts took place in smaller courts, which varied in size from 501 for 
lesser cases up to 1501 for the most serious. Not only were the jurors selected by lot from those 
willing to serve, but those selected were divided by lot into the number of groups required for 
each operating courtroom. Finally, each group was assigned by lot to a particular courtroom with 
checks to make sure that only assigned jurors entered the designated court. Courts sat for one day 
only. 
When the Legislative Boards were introduced, they operated in a similar fashion — also 
drawing from the pool of six thousand. Neither the Courts or the Boards were deliberative in the 
modern sense. Members heard arguments from both sides, but they did not deliberate with each 
other before making a decision.
This widespread use of sortition in ancient Athens was designed to block threats to the 
democratic principles of isonomia (equality before the law) and isegoria (equality in the right to 
speak or participate). Sortition enacted and protected political equality in a society characterized 
by high levels of social and economic inequality. Cleisthenes’ use of territorial units fractured 
existing clientalist relationships and the use of territorial representation (in both electoral and 
sortition contexts) entrenched relationships based on deme and phylai against aristocratic 
kinship-based networks. The use of sortition in all roles not requiring specialist knowledge acted 
as a bulwark against concentrations of power and the effectiveness of bribery, especially in court 
judgments. 
Two further features are salient for our purposes. First, the length of service was limited 
to a maximum of one year before rotation of membership. In many cases, active service was 
6considerably less (e.g., as little as one day in each Court and Board). Second, the institutions that 
used sortition were primarily responsive rather than initiating institutions. Put a little too simply, 
the Ekklesia set the agenda and the Boule, the magistracies, and the Diskateria (and later the 
Nomothetai) exercised enabling, scrutiny, accountability, and implementation functions.
What can we draw from Athenian practice to inform the design of a sortition legislature? 
First, there is no direct historical equivalent to such a body. The People’s Courts or the later 
Legislative Boards bear the closest family resemblance, but these are a long way from the type of 
sortition chamber Gastil and Wright propose because of the Athenian bodies’ more limited 
functions, larger size, rapid rotation, and non-deliberative character. Second, although the 
application of sortition can be a bulwark against the power of economic and social factions and 
realize particular forms of political equality, in Athenian institutions this was achieved by 
combining sortition with rapid rotation.
<B>Deliberative minipublics
Sortition has been used extensively in legal juries in countries such as the United States, United 
Kingdom and France, but rarely has it been considered for selection in modern political 
institutions. Recent years, though, have witnessed increasing interest in sortition within 
deliberative minipublics. Such bodies are typically sponsored by a political authority, but 
organized by an independent agency that facilitates group discussions among a (near) random 
sample of citizens, who take evidence from experts and interested parties.2 
2
 Graham Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.72-110; Kimmo Grönlund André Bächtiger 
Maija Setälä (eds), Deliberative Mini-Publics: Involving Citizens in the Democratic Process 
7The recent wave of minipublics traces back to the pioneering work of Peter Dienel in 
Germany and Ned Crosby in the US who, respectively, created and organized planning cells and 
citizens’ juries.3 The intervening decades have seen the emergence of other designs that 
incorporate forms of sortition, including deliberative polls, consensus conferences, citizens’ 
assemblies, reference panels and G1000s. Notable experiments include the incorporation of 
elected politicians as members in the Irish Constitutional Convention and broader sets of social 
and political actors in G1000s in the Netherlands alongside randomly-selected citizens. Very few 
minipublics, with the exception of cases such as the Citizens’ Initiative Review, are an 
institutionalized element of political systems. Most are sponsored in an ad-hoc fashion and the 
adoption of their recommendations is far from systematic.
There are differences in the way that these institutions apply sortition. Most use 
stratification techniques to ensure a demographically representative cross-section of particular 
social characteristics (e.g. gender, ethnicity, age). To a certain extent, this resonates with 
selection from the demes in ancient Athens. Larger minipublics, such as deliberative polls, rely 
on simple random selection. Again, there are differences in the length of time that such bodies 
sit. G1000s are one-day events; most of the others run over 2 to 4 days. The outlier here are 
citizens’ assemblies which have run over a number of weekends. For example, the British 
(Colchester, ECPR Press, 2014); Maija Setälä and Graham Smith, ‘Mini-publics and deliberative 
democracy’, in André Bächtiger, John Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge and Mark E. Warren (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2018).
3
 The characteristics of these and other minipublic designs discussed in this section are explained 
in Smith, op cit; Grönlund, Bächtiger and Setälä, op cit; and Setälä and Smith, op cit.
8Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA) brought together 160 citizens and ran over a dozen 
weekends over a period of 11 months.
Why is sortition used in these institutions? First, organizers value sortition as a selection 
mechanism for its capacity to realize a particular form of political equality (i.e., equal probability 
of being invited). Whether or not claims of descriptive representation can be sustained (given the 
impact of self-selection and/or stratification), sortition generates a more diverse sample of 
participants than established engagement mechanisms, which tend to replicate differential 
participation rates and thus differentials of power across social groups. Second, the combination 
of sortition with facilitation and balanced information creates the conditions for deliberative 
reasoning and considered judgement. 
For advocates such as James Fishkin, minipublics are important because they combine 
random selection with deliberation to generate a counterfactual will formation—“What the 
public would think, had it a better opportunity to consider the question at issue.”4 In our view, 
more important is the connection with Athenian practice: Minipublics represent a safe haven5 in 
which citizens are politically equal and protected from economic and social power. Unlike their 
4
 James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (Durham, Duke University Press, 2007). In From 
Radical to Deliberative Democracy?, Yves Sintomer points out that the Greeks did not have 
access to ideas about probability sampling and thus the generation of random samples and the 
idea of counterfactual judgements was not part of their understanding of sortition bodies.
5
 Simone Chambers, 'Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation', 
The Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004): 289-410
9Athenian forebears, however, minipublics are sites of collective deliberation and not just public 
judgement.
How can the practice of deliberative minipublics inform the design of the proposed 
sortition chamber? There has been an explosion of social scientific research, much of which 
provides evidence for the promise of minipublics: Citizens who participate appear willing and 
able to reach sound judgments and recommendations on highly complex technical issues;6 in 
turn, minipublics are viewed as trusted institutions by the wider public.7 
Selection through sortition helps enable a deliberative politics by ensuring that a diversity 
of social perspectives is brought to bear, but it is only one amongst many design characteristics, 
not all of which transfer so easily to a permanent legislative body. Mini-publics rely extensively 
on trained facilitation to ensure that interactions between the diverse participants, with very 
different capacities and experience, are free and fair. How suitable is such interventionist 
facilitation for a legislative body? Also, deliberative minipublics generally have been one-off 
affairs, which ensures a de facto rotation of membership between minipublics (as well as 
changes in sponsors, organizers and facilitators). The longest period of participation has been 
around a dozen weekends for citizens’ assemblies held in Canada, the Netherlands, and Ireland. 
The Irish Assembly (and its mixed Constitutional Convention cousin) is a rare example where a 
single minipublic has dealt with more than one issue. Finally, previous minipublics have been 
carefully crafted spaces in which citizens are protected from partisan interests. In this sense, 
6
 Setälä and Smith, ‘Mini-Publics and Deliberative Democracy’.
7
 Mark Warren and John Gastil, John, ‘Can Deliberative Minipublics Address the Cognitive 
Challenges of Democratic Citizenship?’ The Journal of Politics, 77, 2 (2015): 582-574.
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there is a shared trajectory with the historical precedent of Athens. Interest groups, political 
parties and the media are kept at arms-length. In sum, the one-off nature of minipublics, the 
variety of different sponsors and the independence of organizers and facilitators all help to 
protect these spaces. 
Ironically, protection from outside pressures and interference may also derive 
significantly from the fact that, to date, minipublics have been relatively marginal political 
institutions. Were minipublics to be used more extensively and to have more significant political 
import, this would almost certainly generate “powerful incentives for interest groups and partisan 
elites to try to manipulate [these] deliberative forums.”8 Here, we can draw parallels between 
minipublics and legal juries. The history of legal juries, as expressed in the evolution of laws 
against jury-tampering and of options such as sequestration, points to the risks posed by external 
manipulation. Such devices may be used rarely today precisely because their availability serves 
as a general deterrent against external manipulations, while their presence serves both to register 
the gravity of the threat when such manipulation does occur and the seriousness with which it is 
regarded. The sortition chamber proposal in its current form does not avail itself of these kinds of 
protections.
8
 Michael A. Neblo, Deliberative Democracy between Theory and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.181; see also Yanis Papadopoulos, ‘On the embeddedness 
of deliberative systems: Why elistist innovations matter more.’, in John Parkinson and Jane 
Mansbridge (eds.) Deliberative systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 
125-150.
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Though the functioning of deliberative minipublics offer some grounds for optimism for 
the practice of a sortition legislature, differences in structural function and design make them a 
poor analogy for the proposed sortition chamber. Gastil and Wright’s proposal requires much 
more significant time contributions from participants, engagement across a range of issues, and 
has significant political power – factors that enable and motivate the exercise of systematic 
pressure by interested external agents. 
<A>Evaluating the sortition legislature proposal
Our exploration of the circumstances of sortition in both historical Athens and its contemporary 
application in deliberative minipublics suggests that the sortition chamber has qualitatively 
different characteristics from previous sortition institutions. First, there is no precedent for a 
political institution exercising significant public power that uses sortition as a selection 
mechanism, but does not combine this with regular rotation and, where relevant, the use of 
sortition in the distribution of offices within the institution. Second, there appears to be no 
precedent for a sortition body that has such an expansive mandate ranging from agenda-setting to 
scrutiny. Specifically, we cannot find any examples of the effective use of sortition bodies to 
undertake agenda-setting functions.
These historical and contemporary examples provide support for our contention that the 
proposed sortition chamber is wanting from a democratic perspective. The failure of the chamber 
either to combine sortition with rotation or to limit its mandate leave the membership exposed to 
12
negative expressions of social and economic power. 9 We explore each of these design 
weaknesses in turn. Without incorporating these institutional devices, we claim, it is unrealistic 
to expect the chamber to be a body in which equals engage in a process of public reasoning 
orientated towards shared practical judgements.  
<B>The case for rotation
The use of sortition to select members to the proposed sortition chamber exemplifies a formal 
commitment to enacting political equality in the way that it brings a diversity of citizens into the 
center of formal and official political power. In so doing, it has the potential to alter citizens’ 
self-understanding of the meaning of citizenship, being a vivid example of Aristotle’s conception 
of democratic citizenship as ruling and being ruled in turn. Given the relatively small number of 
members, even if such chambers were implemented at other levels of governance, the chance of 
any particular citizen being selected for any such body during their lifetime remains slim. 
Nevertheless, one should not underestimate how transformative the political effects of such a 
change could be with citizens seeing their peers in decision-making positions. 
However, the realization of political equality is potentially only formal rather than 
substantive. This is because the proposal’s sole focus on sortition in terms of selection 
unhelpfully abstracts from its historical pairing with other mechanisms and processes, such as 
regular rotation of membership and the use of sortition and rotation for offices within the 
sortition body. The application of these mechanisms is absent, leaving the functioning of the 
9
 In the analysis that follows we consider a simple legislative assembly and avoid discussion of 
the UK case in which government ministers are drawn from both legislative assemblies. This 
would add a further level of complexity to the design of a sortition chamber.
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assembly, in particular its capacity to promote deliberative rather than strategic action, 
vulnerable to those who would aim to subvert it for their own ends.
Two aspects of the proposal are particularly concerning for how power is exercised in the 
legislative body: the length of service and the distribution of offices within the assembly. Two 
options are envisaged for terms of office: either a five-year term or a two-year term with an 
option for renewal. In both instances, membership would rotate, with a portion of the body being 
refreshed each year.10 Once selected, members would be allocated committee membership based 
on length of service and their preferences: “Current committee members who remain in the 
assembly could retain their most preferred committee assignments, then enter into a lottery with 
the rest of the selectees, each of whom would have ranked their preferences like students signing 
up for courses.”11 
To our knowledge, such long terms of continual service and the freedom of members to 
choose areas of work according to preference and length of service are unprecedented for a 
sortition body. In ancient Athens, where the Council, Courts and Boards selected members 
randomly by lot, there was relatively rapid rotation of tasks and offices. In the Council, which 
had the longest term of service of one year, members held the most significant posts for only 
one-tenth of the year before rotation and in the Courts and Boards citizens were randomly 
selected and rotated between cases. 
The longest time commitment in a single contemporary minipublic has been the twelve 
weekends of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, which met over ten months. The Irish 
10




Citizens’ Assembly met over a longer period of time (sixteen months) but demanded one fewer 
weekend of service from participants. In some deliberative minipublics, there are times when 
participants break into self-selected working groups. Even then, those subgroups are designed to 
avoid concentrating power in the hands of a small cadre of members, and facilitators ensure free 
and fair deliberation between participants. 
This combination of length of service and choice of work areas based on that service has 
potentially serious negative effects on the capacity of the sortition chamber to realize political 
equality and deliberative reasoning in its day-to-day workings. We can see this in two ways. 
Internally, concentration of power—and with it the capacity to strongly influence proceedings of 
the Assembly—is likely to rest with a small number of members who hold significant committee 
offices. There is brief mention in the sortition chamber proposal of possible experimentation with 
trained facilitators (or, more worryingly, current or former sortition legislators who would not 
necessarily have the relevant capacities), but it is not clear how this would be combined with the 
work of self-selected committees over long periods. If trained facilitators are not present or their 
role is reduced substantially compared to deliberative minipublics, so the domination by more 
powerful and socially privileged members is likely to appear and, with it, group dynamics that 
are antithetical to democratic functioning. In the current formulation of the sortition chamber, the 
relationship between facilitation and emergent modes of leadership is underspecified, although it 
is difficult to conceive how the style of facilitation common in minipublics could map onto this 
type of sortition body. It is then a reasonable concern that substantive equality and deliberative 
reasoning between members will be diminished. Secondly, the relatively small number of 
members and their relatively long period of service expose the institution to the dangers of 
subversion by powerful interests beyond the chamber, including targeting by media outlets, yet 
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members have relatively little protection unless significant changes are made to the wider 
institutional ecology. This is likely to be exacerbated where particular individuals within the 
sortition legislature are able to concentrate power by holding onto positions on committees 
(including the position of chair). These individuals will inevitably become particular targets for 
external groups looking to influence the deliberation and decisions of those committees, not least 
since they are also likely to become power-brokers within the assembly.
Sortition is intended to guard against the negative impact of expressions of economic 
power and social influence, but once members of the sortition chamber are selected, they are 
vulnerable to traditional lobbying activities that transmit the inequalities of civil society to the 
formal political domain. They are left exposed in the same way as elected legislators—but 
without the defenses that membership of a political party can offer. Being a representative who is 
part of an organized political party reduces the scope of individual discretion over agenda-
setting, party discipline reduces discretion over voting and party competition provides incentives 
for monitoring the conduct of legislators. While parties may undermine the deliberative potential 
of legislatures, as collective organizations they can, at their best, exercise power over their 
legislative representatives in ways that counter incentives for external targeting of individual 
representatives and their susceptibility to such targeting, while the accountability of party leaders 
to the wider membership acts as an obstacle to successful external targeting of the leadership. 
A sortition chamber embedded within a bicameral system, as envisioned by Gastil and 
Wright, will also be subject to pressures from the elected chamber, especially when there is 
disagreement between them. We are familiar with bicameral legislatures competing with—and 
employing strategies of de-legitimation towards—one another. It would be naïve not to expect 
politically experienced politicians from the elected chamber to employ such strategies to 
16
embolden their standing and influence vis-à-vis the sortition chamber. It is not at all clear what 
resources the sortition chamber will be able or willing to bring to bear to withstand such strategic 
action.12 
The small number of members, length of term, and specialization of roles also invites 
more insidious forms of influence—namely, corruption and bribery. Some of the practices that 
Gastil and Wright suggest as defenses against this, such as periods of private discussion and the 
use of secret ballots,13 can have the opposite effect by reducing mutual accountability within the 
assembly and the already limited degree of public accountability generated by public voting. 
It is plausible that these vulnerabilities may be reduced if legislators in both chambers as 
well as individuals and organizations seeking to influence them, are subject to disciplinary 
scrutiny by a body such as the People’s Court on the Athenian model. No doubt, other changes—
such as strengthening laws governing lobbying—could also act to reduce these vulnerabilities. 
These problems are liable to be worsened by factions, alliances and party organization 
within the body. Gastil and Wright stress that “a place for traditional caucusing should remain,” 
or “members could organize themselves into a larger number of more cohesive groups of like-
minded legislators, who share common values and priorities.”14 Either of these—and especially 
their combination—threatens to move the legislature away from the deliberative ideal of 
12







autonomous agents swayed by the force of the better argument and towards a more structured 
partisanship that works across issue areas. 
Historical precedent, particularly from Athens, suggests that the combination of larger 
numbers, sortition in both initial selection and the allocation of offices alongside rapid rotation 
offer a possible solution to the challenges that we have posed, while the experience of 
contemporary minipublics suggests that the combination of sortition with trained facilitation is 
critical for deliberative quality. However, addressing these problems through the complementary 
mechanisms that we propose constructs a deeper problem for the proposed sortition chamber. 
The factors that potentially undermine political equality and deliberative reasoning within the 
legislature and expose members to powerful economic and social interests—its small size, long 
service, and specialization—are arguably necessary conditions for a key aspect of the sortition 
chamber proposal–its agenda setting function.
<B>The case for limited mandate
As far as we are aware, there is no historical or contemporary precedent for a single body, 
selected by sortition, that combines agenda setting and scrutiny in a deliberative fashion in the 
way that the sortition chamber intends. In Athenian democracy, a number of sortition bodies with 
very different and distinct political functions were employed around the central assembly. We 
can draw similar lessons from another contemporary field of participatory practice where the 
designers of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre crafted different institutions for different 
aspects of agenda setting, rule-making and decision making. They recognized that combining 
functions in the same body is likely to have perverse democratic results.15 Later participatory 
15
 Smith, Democratic Innovations, pp.30-71.
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budgeting systems have been less effective in realizing political equality, deliberative reasoning 
and popular control precisely because of their failure to separate these functions.16 
Gastil and Wright are enthusiastic about the capacity of deliberative minipublics in 
making their argument for a sortition chamber. “Randomly selected bodies have shown an 
inclination,” they argue, “to find common ground and recommend workable solutions to the 
policy problems placed on their agendas.”17 The final part of that sentence is indicative of the 
challenge the sortition chamber faces: Deliberative minipublics work on problems placed on the 
agenda by others. They do not select, or even usually frame, these problems. Ensuring a safe 
space within which common ground and workable solutions emerge may be undermined if 
minipublics were a site for competition over agenda setting. We have the same concern for the 
sortition chamber—that agenda setting and scrutiny may pull the institution in different 
directions. The former function may well be detrimental to its democratic capacity. 
Agenda setting can be broken down into at least three separate functions: collation of 
ideas, filtering of ideas, and management of the agenda once it has been agreed. Within 
traditional elected legislatures, these functions are undertaken (or at least overseen) principally 
by political parties. It is not at all clear how these functions would be realized in the proposed 
16
 Ernesto Ganuza and Gianpaolo Baiocchi, ‘The Power of Ambiguity: How Participatory 
Budgeting Travels the Globe,’ Journal of Public Deliberation, 8, 2 (2012), Article 8; Yves 
Sintomer, Carsten Herzberg, Anja Röcke, and Giovanni Allegretti, ‘Transnational Models of 
Citizen Participation: The Case of Participatory Budgeting,’ Journal of Public Deliberation, 8, 2 
(2012), Article 9.
17
 Gastil and Wright, ‘Legislature by Lot’, p.7.
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sortition chamber. As for collation of ideas, sortition legislators will not have knowledge of the 
full range of ideas. Though a demographically diverse group is epistemically important for 
collective judgement, it does not equate to full knowledge of the range and dimensions of issues 
facing the legislature. Therefore, there will need to be processes through which members are 
exposed to different possibilities. 
How is this to be done? We can see a range of options, all potentially undesirable from a 
democratic perspective. One option draws on the practice of deliberative minipublics, where 
facilitation and provision of balanced information and witnesses is overseen by an independent 
body supported by a stakeholder advisory group. In their proposal, Gastil and Wright only focus 
on the provision of independent facilitation: helping “citizens work through their agenda, 
manage speaking time, and ensure respectful discourse.”18 How balanced information is to be 
provided to the sortition legislature is not clear, especially in relation to problem definition and 
agenda setting. Gastil and Wright are too relaxed, we fear, in their evaluation of the dangers of 
technocratic capture.19 The autonomy of members is in real danger of being compromised as 
more responsibilities are passed to independent or administrative agencies.
A second option is that certain members of the legislature—those who have served more 
years, are committee chairs and/or who enter with the requisite political skills—would take on 
leadership roles and drive the agenda-setting process. But this immediately jeopardizes political 
equality and undermines deliberative equality as some members are privileged over others, while 






A third option implicit in the sortition chamber proposal relies on party caucuses or some 
other forms of faction to collate and filter ideas and manage the agenda-setting process. As we 
have already argued, this reduces political equality and replicates the very practices of elected 
legislatures that sortition is meant to ameliorate. The relative autonomy of the sortition 
legislature is lost, as is the deliberative difference that sortition bodies bring as countervailing 
powers. Without parties or organized factions, however, the different aspects of agenda setting 
will be vulnerable targets of lobbying and other more nefarious activities by organized interests.
Returning to the examples of the Athenian system and participatory budgeting, the 
deliberative qualities of the sortition chamber are under threat if it is takes on agenda setting and 
scrutiny functions. Deliberating over agendas is a very different activity from deliberating over 
options for a particular policy or legislative decision. Thus, for example, in agenda setting there 
is always the danger that members’ favored ideas or issues are not taken forward or given low 
priority. This, in turn, generates incentives to engage in coalition-building and tactical alliances 
(that is, mimicry of party formations), or else to confront a situation in which (except by luck) 
one loses out—at which stage the motivation to participate in the scrutiny of options on an issue 
one does not see as a priority is likely to be much reduced. 
We recognize the need within contemporary democratic societies for what we might term 
counter-hegemonic agenda setting. Elites get their issues on the agenda too easily and too often; 
this is, after all, one source of their power. But we are not convinced that the sortition chamber 
can realize this counter-hegemonic potential. It will be subject to pressures from powerful 
organized interests that it will be unable to manage democratically. Those who wish to retain an 
agenda-setting role for a sortition legislature must provide a stronger account of how this role is 
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to be facilitated and how leadership is to be enacted to drive agendas in a way that does not 
undermine political equality and/or deliberative quality. 
Consequently, we hold that there are good reasons to remove agenda setting from the 
sortition chamber, making it a more responsive body that engages primarily in scrutiny. It may 
be possible to conceive of a separate sortition agenda-setting assembly—perhaps one that is 
embedded in a wider order of sortition bodies that generate ideas for collation and ranking, 
although there is little successful historical or contemporary practice to draw on and our 
considerations of how it might function leave us with good reasons as to why it may be difficult 
to achieve. Certainly, it would be prudent to experiment with such a structure in lower risk 
environments to discern the relevant design issues that it would confront before inserting such a 
body at the apex of the formal democratic system.
<A>Conclusion: A realistic and utopian alternative
Historical and contemporary precedents suggest that for an assembly to inhibit the unjustified 
exercise of power by economic and social groups, selection by sortition is not enough. To 
counter such activities and realize political equality and deliberative reasoning, one must 
combine sortition in selection with rapid rotation of membership and the use of sortition and 
rotation for office within the assembly. Even with those features in place, a single sortition body 
cannot fulfil agenda-setting and scrutiny functions simultaneously.
As it stands, the proposed sortition chamber is neither realistic nor utopian. It is too 
ambitious for the former, not ambitious enough for the latter. A more realistic approach to 
democratic design separates the functions of agenda setting and scrutiny. A more utopian 
outcome, in which the sortition chamber plays an agenda-setting role, requires a wholescale 
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restructuring of the broader institutional ecology, which in the current formulation remains 
relatively untouched.
For those interested in the use of sortition in contemporary politics, there is a strong 
tendency to focus attention on legislative bodies. Such bodies are clearly important sites for 
democratic reform, but we need to consider the wider political canvas and reflect on the variety 
of roles that sortition can play to enhance the system’s democratic qualities. 
To stay within the scope of this book, however, we conclude by suggesting an alternative 
design for a sortition legislature. In doing so, we draw most directly on the practice of the 
People’s Courts and Legislative Boards in Ancient Athens and more recent experience of 
deliberative minipublics. Our proposed sortition process would play a responsive role, draw on a 
much wider pool of members, and use sortition and more rapid rotation to assign members to 
work on particular legislative issues as they emerge. 
By focusing on a responsive function for the assembly, we are not arguing that it is an 
elected chamber that must set the agenda, just that the agenda would be set outside the sortition 
legislature. In the first instance, it is likely that the body would be responsive to the agenda of the 
elected chamber and would thus play a role in overseeing and scrutinizing legislative and policy 
proposals from that chamber. There are other more or less participatory ways that the agenda 
might be set (for example through an initiative process), but that is not our primary concern here. 
Neither will we be concerned with how a separate sortition body might play an agenda-setting 
role within the legislative system, though our earlier analysis augurs against such a body
Second, we envision a much wider pool of members of the sortition assembly. The 6,000 
from which the People’s Courts and Legislative Boards were selected in Athens may be a good 
starting point, although the number could be higher. Our preference is that service is compulsory, 
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with exemptions for pressing personal/professional needs, as for the summons to jury service. As 
in the sortition chamber proposal, legislators would be compensated generously in recognition of 
the significance of their role. If compulsory service were deemed unacceptable, then the 
selection of the 6,000 would be demographically stratified. 
The full membership of 6,000 citizens would only meet as a body for training purposes—
to be educated about their legislative role. Following Athenian practice, a smaller pool of 
members would be summoned randomly from this larger body (applying stratification) to be 
divided by lot for smaller issue-assemblies of between, say, 150 to 300 according to the number 
of tasks. And then finally, the members would be assigned by lot to the particular issue. A 
formula would be needed to ascertain how long each separate assembly would need to meet, but 
the longest citizens’ assemblies that have worked on complex constitutional issues have required 
no more than twenty-five day sessions. Those who serve in any given session would be ineligible 
for the next one. The 6,000 body would itself be rotated on a regular basis, every one to two 
years.20
Unlike the Athenian Courts and Boards, the smaller issue-based assemblies would be 
deliberative in character and last longer than one day. To this end, they would work in similar 
ways to existing deliberative minipublics. A central administrative organization would need to be 
established, with independence from government. This would be a specialist body whose role 
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would be to select trained facilitators by lot from a general pool for each session and to select an 
advisory board. The board, in turn, would oversee the development of balanced learning 
materials and the appointment of expert witnesses, who reflect the range of viewpoints and 
interests on the issue before an assembly. 
In designing such an administrative body, we can draw on the experience of the 
autonomous public bodies charged with organizing public participation such as the Tuscany 
Participation Authority (Italy), the National Commission on Public Debate (France), and the 
Quebec Environmental Public Hearings Board (Canada).21 A danger of capture by technocratic 
or social and economic interests would remain, but that risk would be diluted by the random 
allocation of sortition legislators—and facilitators—to particular sessions.
As to the powers of the sortition legislature, there are a number of options. Let us assume 
initially that the sortition body is scrutinizing proposed legislation from the elected legislature. 
The weakest option would be delay—a mechanism for sending a piece of legislation back to the 
elected chamber for further consideration if it was not supported by a majority of the sortition 
legislature. This would leave the balance of power very much with the elected body. 
An alternative would require a particular level of support from the sortition legislature for 
a bill to become law. It is possible to imagine a range of stipulations for how decision making 
might progress. A simple majority might be all that is needed for passage of legislation, or a 
supermajority might be required. For example, sixty percent support in the sortition body might 
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be required for legislation to pass, whereas below forty percent would kill a bill. Anything in 
between would send the legislation back to the elected body for reconsideration. 
An ingenious alternative that would bring the wider public into the process might follow 
the practice at Leeds University Students Union in the UK, where passage requires seventy-five 
percent support from within a minipublic, less than twenty-five percent means failure, but any 
result in between triggers a binding referendum. Moreover, the sortition legislature could link to 
a popular petition process that bypassed the elected chamber to give the broader citizenry the 
authority to propose new laws or suggest repeals.22 Petitions meeting a signature threshold would 
come before the sortition legislature, which would treat them in the same way as a proposal from 
the elected chamber. In these ways, the sortition legislature would play the role of reviewing, 
repealing, and inspecting laws not too dissimilar from the functions played by Athenian 
Legislative Boards.
 We believe our formulation would be protective and transformative. It is protective 
because the large number of members of the body and the random allocation to issue-
assemblies—combined with the limited duration of each session—makes it considerably more 
difficult for powerful economic and social forces to affect its practice. The Athenian concern to 
obstruct the bribery of juries by the wealthy provides a good analogy for the concerns of 
contemporary democracies with lobbying (and related activities), and we think their approach to 
dealing with the problem merits serious attention. Like its Athenian forebear, our model also has 
greater transformative power, by increasing substantially the likelihood of citizens being called 
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to serve. This transformative power would be further amplified if the proposal was adopted for 
the numerous sub-national legislatures within a polity. 
In closing, we believe our proposal is transformative in another sense. Counterintuitively 
perhaps, it is utopian in its strategic ambition of being simply a first step toward more radical 
change in the democratic ecology. Our more prudent approach, grounded in historical and 
contemporary democratic experience, lessens the risk of damage to the reputation of sortition and 
citizen participation in the legislative process. As a result, we hope this would provide a stronger 
basis on which to develop the civic consciousness and political practices necessary for more 
radical future reshaping of democratic institutions through sortition.
